Segregation in the 21st Century Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

Segregation in the 21st Century - Essay Example The media perpetrates segregation or white supremacy at every turn.   Social stereotypes also prevail in the American media.   Even though these themes are subtle, they are strong.   Even in cartoon movies, these stereotypes exist.   For example, â€Å"Dumbo (1941), the crows that teach Dumbo how to fly â€Å"are too obviously Negro caricatures† (Avila 132).   The portrayal of black crows as crude, ignorant, and with a bad southern accent is ridiculous.   White people from the south can be crude and ignorant.   Most Southerners have southern accents, whether they are black, white, red, or yellow.   Disney movies seem to have bad representations of ethnic people.   Pocahontas and Mulan are feeble attempts to be politically correct, but manage to portray them very stereotypical.   Most of the heroes are white, Prince Charming, John Smith, and numerous others.   The media perpetrates segregation or white supremacy at every turn.   Social stereotypes also prevail in the American media.   Even though these themes are subtle, they are strong.   Even in cartoon movies, these stereotypes exist.   For example, â€Å"Dumbo (1941), the crows that teach Dumbo how to fly â€Å"are too obviously Negro caricatures† (Avila 132).   White people from the south can be crude and ignorant.   Most Southerners have southern accents, whether they are black, white, red, or yellow.   Disney movies seem to have bad representations of ethnic people.  

Edcaution Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Edcaution - Assignment Example Secondly, designers of norm-referenced tests should pick the content taught in the many schools, in the country. This is especially in the case of nationwide or district-wide examinations. Essay questions, true or false tests, matching questions, definition and open-ended questions are examples of criterion-referenced tests. They measure a student’s level of competence based on a preset standard without comparing him or her with peers. The objectives of the course and the curriculum inform the setting of criterion-referenced tests. These tests are most helpful when they measure students’ ability in given areas. There exists a need to ensure high validity and reliability of these tests. Firstly, designers of these tests should ensure that they pick the content matching the objectives of the course and the standards of the curriculum (Popham, 2008). A big cluster around the high end of the grading system shows many students met the standards. Secondly, the designers of these tests should suspend their biases. Bias-free tests are fair to all students regardless of gender, ethnic background, race and socio-economic status. High-stakes tests are another group of tests besides norm-referenced tests. The outcomes of these tests serve to make important decisions in people’s lives. A licensure examination is an example of a high-stakes test. This is because the results of the examination help decide the possibility of an examinee getting a permit to practice as a professional nurse (Kubiszyn & Borich, 2007). Because the results of high-stakes tests determine whether individuals get permits to do something or not, they need high reliability and validity. Speed tests measure the rate at which individuals can perform a given task. The test measures the speed of performance only and not the knowledge of individuals. There is a possibility of misusing

Mannerism in art: An analysis

Mannerism in art: An analysis The stylistic categories are an important aspect of the history of art. Gombrich (1985) suggests that classification is a necessary evil that if taken as a tool that is also flexible and modifiable, can be valuable for art historians. Gombrich notes that while useful, categorisation has also been prone to critical abuse (p81). In other words derogatory nomenclature was often used when naming an art historical era. Baroque, which I would consider a very refined phase of technically crafted dramatic art, in fact was defined by the Oxford pocket dictionary of 1934 as grotesque (p81) as this was the immediate summary of its worth in the seventeenth century. Kaufman (2010) indicated that the categories mark historic periods of individual artists, however art critical analysis has always made it difficult to distinguish the categories and this has led to individual historians describing the categories or styles differently. To establish a permanent and agreed name to a genre or era of art could only happen successfully after that period had expired and time had lapsed for thorough deliberation it requires time and broadmindedness to deal with (Gombrich,1985, p81). Gombrich also states that such categories help us in the mastering an unstructured reality that is to say that as long as criticality in our application of such categories is maintained, new insights about what constitutes them can be gained. Categorisation is limited by language, complex concepts cannot always be expressed by words, and categories are often oversimplified into opposites: good/bad, visual/haptic, left/right etc. This system of opposites allows a range of values in between. In order to create an art category a style must be distinct and unique, therefore necessitating a term to describe it. If a style is neither unique nor distinct it would not require classification. Kaufmann (2010) believed that despite numerous stylistic terminology (p2) all art can be categorised into two major categories which are classical and non-classical. For example, Gothic art is classified as non-classical, while Barbaric and Barocco were described as post classical and degenerate at that time. However irrespective of this norm, there were exceptions to some styles like Mediaeval which was regarded as less beautiful but had some worthy attributes such as being more devout, more honest or more strong which according to historians of the time counted for more than mere orderliness (Gombrich,1985, p86). As Gombrich points out, the problem underlying the categorisation of art is the claim that arose in the 19th century that art historians can look at the historical development of styles in an objective and unbiased manner. That is to say without being influenced by their own agendas, political standpoints, need for oversimplification or cognitive biases. This is the proble m underlying all art categorisation, and through this understanding we can now go on to analyse the topic of mannerism as a historical art category. This essay will first of all attempt to offer a definition of mannerism, pointing out some inherent difficulties in doing so, it will then go on to look at some of the benefits of describing the historical period conventionally labelled as mannerist in this way, before looking at some of the drawbacks. Finally conclusions will be made about how helpful it is as a concept in the categorisation of historical art. 2. Mannerism as an art category 2.1 What is Mannerism, and why is the term controversial as an art category? Mannerism as it has been conventionally described in modern interpretations of historical art, is a style which came between the high Renaissance and the Baroque (1510-20 to 1600) periods and is sometimes was referred to as the late Renaissance (Wundram1985). One of the first issues when discussing Mannerism, is identifying exactly when it started, and when it finished, as while in Italy, it is thought to have ended in around 1580, but Northern Mannerism is thought to have extended into the early 17th century in Europe (Freedberg,1971). However according to Smyth (1992, p13) this set of stylistic conventions began to be adopted in around 1530, before becoming the norm in the 1540s and 1550s in the work of Vasari and his contemporaries. This highlights one of the first difficulties art historians have with the broad category of Mannerism. Deriving from the Italian maneriera, Mannerism refers to a style or manner and what exactly constitutes Mannerism has also been a matter of debate in art history. The term has been widely used in literature and architecture as well as in art. Vasari as a central Mannerist himself used the term to discuss an artists manner or method, in describing a particular artists style, and in attributing praise. However, the term has also been used according to Franklin (2001) by Vasari himself to criticise the work of Perugino as mannered meaning that his style was repetitious and this was thought to be unaturalistic and therefore negative (p14). Miedima (1978-79) points out that the term was originally used as a term of opprobrium (p20). As illustrated through these examples the term Mannerism and what is meant by it may have given rise to great deal of confusion as successive art historians used the term. What constitutes mannerism as a style is also not without its problems. Miedema (1978-9) defines the stylistic features thought of as Mannerism as artificiality, affectation, the stereotype and monotony furthermore these were interpreted arbitrarily as: anti-classicism, subjectivity, torment, anxiety and doubt, and violent emotionality (p21). Problematic is that fact that a term used to express what was negative about some art in the sixteenth century until around the nineteenth century has now been expanded to characterize the style of what we speak of as representing the entire period (ibid). The style of the period can also be seen as contravening the high Renaissance classical rule rooted more on visual perception and scientific naturalism. Rather mannerism is thought to be based more on intellectual preoccupation as evident in the late works of Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael and mid-career works of Michelangelo Mannerism as a style is not easy to categorise because of its diversity (Smith, 2007). The label defined a significant change in social behaviour and a noticeable brilliance in techniques of works of some artists. The term Mannerism itself is quite a profound indicator of the perception of general aesthetics. It denotes the acknowledgement of Style- the recognition of stylization integral to any art work and the implications this brings: Manipulation, adaption, abstraction. This in turn may have also have taken some of the devout piety away from the function of art works. Elongated forms, precariously balanced poses, and collapsed perspective; irrational settings and theatrical settings were reflected amongst characteristics of mannerists works. Parmigianos Work Madonna (1534-40) Florence, Uffizi, is a good example of the change of style and it was greatly believed to have been influenced by Raphael, but gave a great anti-classic character. Smith (2007, p) described the Madonna: Proportions are lengthened so that forms are attenuated; perspective is exaggerated, and there is great discrepancies of scale between the virgin and her attendants. Again a feeling of disquiet is produced by the column beautifully finished, but like a ruin supporting nothing, or* the enigmatic gentleman who opens a great scroll but instead of reading it turns his head in the opposite direction. The Madonna with the Long Neck is a very good example of divergent style from naturalism. The distorted proportion exemplified by elongated neck and arms brings about the concept of abstraction which was not the norm with the previous style. Smiths (2007) description concurs with the definition of Mannerists being advocates of tension and ambiguity as opposed to the rounded harmony of high renaissance. Mannerist composition lacks the balance and legibility that would have been necessary for art to be considered a complete, where all the relative parts played a role and reason was prominent. The whole perception of the entire work brings about an attitude of laziness or lack of seriousness especially to those used to high renaissance. The argument for the distortions would be that the artist was trying to heighten the notion of elegance and grace to express these famous historical figures. The mother of Christ therefore, was rendered larger than life or with an unrealistic perfection in certain anatomical features. A further example of Mannerists works is provided by the Scupture of Bologna (1581-83) The Rape of the Sabines. Matsui describes it as: Three figures twisting upwards in such a way as to form a Spiral, allowing, if not demanding, a 360 degree view of the work. Bolognas sculpture took on a flamboyant self-confidence, which clearly proved him to have at least one foot firmly placed in the next era, the Baroque. This goes to show how hard Mannerist artists are to defineà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦. Though the works reflects aspects of Michelangelos, Bologna went further than the usual forms of Michelangelos works by being more extravagant in terms of executing his shapes, which were more prominent in terms of their three dimensional nature, as described by Matsui. Such an approach went beyond the traditional boundaries of High renaissance, and was seen as a new phenomenon and probably the represented the foundation of a new style. High renaissance art being what it was at the time; an art style at peak in terms of its innovation, needed to be built on. Up-coming artists would have viewed the creative arena before them and may have seen invention as the most positive way forward. Another characteristic of mannerism worth noting is the use of space by the mannerist artists. Unlike the Renaissance where the space was definite and the view was provided with a fixed view point, in mannerism the space was extended to infinity and the side boundaries were removed (Wundram, 1985). Many of the themes used in Mannerist work paid homage previous masters works, styles and themes, as opposed to the norm of naturalism. Wundram (1985) points out that the movements focal point was for the first time considered to be in painting. This change in style can be seen as maturation from the high Renaissance and an extension of its qualities. The qualities displayed were anti classism and the move was seen to be a natural progression from High Renaissance. None of these descriptions and examples of what we now describe as Mannerism, solve the issue that the category became the term for defining the style of sixteenth century art, or at least part of that art (Miedema, 1978, p20), and that whether art can be qualified as Mannerist or not has depended on which criteria different authors applied and which were accordingly dismissed (ibid). The issue boils down to the debate around whether Mannerism is a style, a movement, or a period and the fact that it is commonly used to identify the European art and culture of the 16th century (Mobile reference, nd). 2.2 What led to the emergence of Mannerism? Mannerism as an art style emerged during a period of political unrest which includes the reformation, the plague and the sack of Rome in 1527. The style was more popular in Florence and Rome but spread all over Italy and northern Europe (Matsui, 2010). Although the origins of Mannerism have been attributed to the early sixteenth century, in 1555 a more radical style emerged which deviated from the masters in what was described as lazy ignorance or vain rashness, it was regarded as a complete philosophy and method of art (Smyth 1992). It was alleged that, these students became addicted to weak (not incorrect) design and feeble washed out colours, far from the truth and at the same time too resolute (ibid). The exact historical period of mannerism has been a subject of controversy; however it is generally seen to come between High Renaissance and Baroque. It is normally seen as the extension of the High Renaissance though it is mostly seen as Renaissance anti-classicism due to the natu re of works produced which are more abstract and do not reflect nature realistically. Mannerist artists were associated with great intellect and were no longer seen as crafts persons but rather scholars with great admiration of elegance and complexity. They could now stand apart from crafts men and be on equal terms with poets allowing for self-conscious interpretation of the events they recorded. With this freedom came great responsibility especially for visual artist. Poets could record the world with a degree of ambiguity and abstraction, but painters were limited in their presentation to a definite subject matter within the parameters of the four corners and flat nature of the canvass. Given the expectations that the art of the time would accurately represent its subject matter, it would have been extremely difficult to present an image with any degree of distortion or artistic licence. 3 Advantages of using Mannerism as a historical art category The Mannerist era heralded a new period of innovation. The period fostered creativity, through a lack of adherence to the particular principles of the time. There was also a distinctness and sharpness which showed a lot of independent thinking. The structure of work is well defined and well balanced and highly stabilised to support its own particular aesthetic qualities. Using examples of Mannerist art, this section will give evidence to support the notion that in order to communicate about the period, a category such as Mannerism is more helpful than unhelpful. EL Greco, The Annnuncial (1576) (see appendix) is an exceptional work which exemplifies the creativity and beauty of what is thought to be Mannerist art. The theme of the work is religious based, as religion or erotic nature themes were popular due to the upheaval of the period of that time. El Greco personifies successful mannerists art because he engages both exaggerations in his painterly application and his distortions of figures. He leaves out any attempt to render the scene in naturalistic terms; thereby entering fully into the realm of stylistic invention. The work depicts the announcement of birth of Christ, it shows Angle Gabriel appearing before the Virgin Mary accompanied by many other angles above the two figures, a dove painted in glowing white , which spread all the way towards the virgin signifies the presence of the holy spirit. The painting is more congested as figures are juxtaposition to fit in the limited space. Colour contradictions and elongated figures give the painting a general view of uncertainty and menace. But everything about the painting is contrived and makes no attempt to conceal the artifice. El Greco has defied the odds, and has demonstrated some compositional brilliance of the style. EL Greco used elements of design to harmonise the entire work making it aesthetically interesting. The distorted figures and pallet of variety of cool colours gives the work mystical view augmenting the theme. It might have been that El Grecos art was misunderstood during his time (especially the later work), but he was to have a significant impact on later artists. He gains influence amongst the modernist era especially with artists such as Picasso and The German Expressionists. This era of art was more aligned to self-conscious manipulations and personal sensibilities, and it is surprising to see a 16th Century artist stand up to this genre of extreme modernism. In hindsight one could say that El Greco was far beyond his time, and helped influence some of the most extreme and drastic changes in aesthetic awareness that still inform the art world today. It is helpful therefore to have a least a general category of association in which to place El Greco. He may not be noted as an obvious exponent of Mannerism but he falls heavily into its influence, and not by his association with High Renaissance. It is by the particular general detail of categories that we are reliant on placing artists in context to their historical time, and agreeing on the traits that identify them with that genre and not another. The intellectuality that is attributed to the Mannerist period embraced liberal ideologies that allowed for much more creative freedoms in arts and literature. This allowed a whole body of work to flourish that embraced these new liberties. Such work represented a clear departure from previous works represented by High renaissance and clearly showed that the beginning of something very new was happening in terms of stylistic categories. Clearly then, a stylistic category delineating the two periods is necessary. It might not be a coincidence that the first historically recorded female artist Sonofisba Anguissola (a student of Michelangelo) gained acclaim and significant success during these times. Although not a mannerist, she transcended limitations placed on her gender at the time to be considered equal amongst her male counterparts in a male dominated discipline. Did this freedom for intellectual curiosity exhibited by the Mannerists also extend to other disciplines? For instance, Galileos (1564-1642) accurate observations on planetary orbits and scientific theory that contradicted the Roman Catholic Churchs assertions also came towards the end of the Mannerist period. Thus the credit for these advancements needs to be justified under a general label that identifies the era, and the influences that brought about prevalent features of arts and culture at the time. Clearly the artistic paradigm shift represented by Mannerist art deserves a label. It is sometimes useful to have a historical category which reflects the origins of such an important change of convention and under which the collective achievements of a generation can be contextualised. 4 The disadvantages of using the term Mannerism as a Historical art category. Although it is useful to delineate the changes from High renaissance to Mannerism how a particular piece of art can be analysed into one category or another can sometimes present methodological difficulty without a common and agreed frame of reference. Such a conceptual tool is yet to be perfected. The painting Christ before Pilate (Tintoretto, 1565-1567) clearly illustrates this issue, as it has always been controversial whether it is Mannerist or not even though it can be dated to a period thought of as High Mannerist. Some have referred to it as an anti-classical style as it ran counter to High Renaissance, some prefer to look at it as it as late Renaissance while others did not give it any specific category (Smyth,1992). This illustrates the point that if we are to think of Mannerism as a period, rather than an identifiable style as it is commonly viewed then we may find ourselves in difficulty. Likewise if we look at Mannerism as a style rather than a period, a painting such as Tintorettos presents classification difficulties. This illustrates a clear disadvantage of using the term mannerism as a historical art category. However, in a discussion of Christ before Pilot Curtis (in Akker, 2010) looked at Mannerism as a neutral term, that can be seen as a legitimate art category depending on the painting and the argument put forward by the art historian. Furthermore Shearman (1961) also puts forward and argument to defend Mannerism as a good art category, he describes it as decorative stylisation which illustrates meaning of form and called it a stylish style. To illustrate this point he cites the work of Perino del Vaga, Vertumnus and Ponoma (1527) as a good example of Mannerist work. Akker (2010) describes the work: being almost that of the whole design, we are more immediately aware of the freedom in the distribution of their parts, as if they were abstract and not figurative material; for the figures, interlaced one with the other, are also deployed in a remarkably decorative way over the whole surface. This freedom of disposition is obtained by manipulations of considerable torsion, achieved, however, with perfect ease in the figures themselves. Grace, not tension, is the resultà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ But overall though there is still a confusion as to Mannerisms identity as a specific category or a flexible term to reference work that is not quite High Renaissance, nor accessible as Baroque. Franklin, (2001) believes that this leaves it as a rather redundant term in the canons of art classification, and in Mannerisms particular case it is often ignored or goes unnoticed as an art category altogether. The critical view at the time of deemed that Mannerism did not fall or fit well within the contemporary notion of what art was supposed to be (Akker, 2010, p28), and there was said to be a decline in art after the High Renaissance. Painting was said to have reached its peak during the time of Raphael and drastically declined after his death. This decline was attributed to the departure of artists from the then current style, which was based on the study of Nature rather the more intellectual approach based imagination and artifice. These were further described by Lanzi (C.1800) (cited in Akker, 2010) as imitating previous masters work in a literal and servile manner. He believed that the style represents a cultural shift that can be considered an inevitable phase in culture that could be considered normal in any society. He further describes it as a sort of fatality that: seems to prevail in all human things, rendering their duration in the same state of short continuance; so that after attaining their highest elevation, we may assuredly at no distant period look for their decline But the issue of interpretation and accessibility lies only with that time that mannerism was in affect; for in hindsight, with the advantage of noticing succeeding generations of art development, Mannerism looks now like a bold attempt to challenge perceived notions and shock a conditioned establishment into reconsidering its values, or at least speculate on other innovations in visual art. The fact that it was noted for its discrepancies with the established order means it only attracted more attention, and thus necessitated being a category in its own right. The problem of Mannerism being its own distinct category leaves another issue; that of a dual allegiance of those artists who were in part indulging in High Renaissance styles and yet who were also involved with Mannerist tendencies. Michelangelo is one such an artist. His early career paid much attention to copying the old masters; Giotto for instance, but always without complete reverence. He would analyse the drawing but the final rendition would be adopted and altered for his own pursuit in technique (Nagel, 2000). Michelangelos career was spurred by the need to adapt, change, and be inventive. It is not surprising then that he ended up belonging to both camps, and by the later stages of his career was implicated as Mannerist. It is possibly the failure of historical labelling that causes confusion, and indicates a weakness in Mannerism as a historical art category. Mannerism had another very identifiable feature that is, over simplification of forms. This approach has led to many misconception about the style, some view the unrealistic aspects of the work produced as sign of laziness or rushed work done without much consideration technical details (such as correct proportion) or that it lacked serious attention. Friedlaenders(1957) however defended this aspect of Mannerism and stated that such over simplification is due to the distinct character of the artistic and cultural movement in specific places at specific times. Friedlaenders also pointed out that any form of refinement through stylization tends to result in simplification of form. This was very much part of Michelangelos agenda in his later years. His late work often looked unfinished; the Rondanini Pieta (1564) being a prime example. If we did not know it, one would not recognise it as a work of Michelangelo due its rough appearance. Nagel (2001) explains Michelangelos choices as being more to do with process than final appearance. The artists himself is noted for being intrigued about the process of sculpting. He did not anticipate a finished piece, but was open to a sense of discovery that that lay within a block of stone. For Nagel it appears as a reversal of the usual process, where excavation enables the artist to merely discover what already lay within. For this reversal of attitude to take place is a big upheaval in historical terms and requires distinction and categorization. The problem occurs when you have to refer to one artist; who is so well esteemed, as being a practitioner of both these disparate practices. However, there is no reason that the category of Mannerism should be ignored or brushed under the carpet by art historians because of this discrepancy, as will be discussed further in the next section. 5 Discussion The problem with the classical period was that the concept of what constituted an art form was too prescriptive. It was formalised into proportional figures, accurate perspective, round 3 dimensional composition, and naturalistic colour scheme. Under this strict regimen of constructing a painting the artist had little subjective input. It is not surprising that during this era the artists turned to a Mannerist style which allowed room for invention. This change in style marks a change in the perception and the function of an art work. Without a rigid system of application art elements and principles could be explored with a broader and bolder sense of creative design. Suddenly a dynamic quality of rhythm and symmetry evoked more imaginative possibilities in a picture surface, where elongated figures had more potential for movement in themselves. Renaissance art itself was a new achievement at a time of critical self-questioning in: religion, politics and culture. It was a tendency of artists to always be searching for different forms of expression. Mannerism appears to be a consequence of these introspective circumstances, as much as any modern art movement would have been a response to drastic changes to material and social upheavals. Categories seem easier to apply during the twentieth century than during the sixteenth Century due to the rapid succession of various movements that reacted to each other. But Mannerism was just as much a reaction to its predecessor, and a bridge in the historical continuum that leads to the Baroque. A land mark (and thus a historical art history category) therefore applies as well for Mannerism as it does for Cubism. Although mannerism is often over looked as a category in art development, it is in fact a very crucial dividing line in the history of art. It draws a definite line between scientific naturalism and more elaborate creative tendencies. This is very relevant and definitive moment in the transitional annals of art development. It defines a moment when the hierarchy of the art establishment was challenged and superseded to allow choice and alternative applications. As Kaufmann (2010) notes, although there may have been disagreement about whether a work of art should be labelled a particular label, such debates were often productive and new period concepts, like Mannerism, were discussed. As stated in the introduction as long as such historical debates continue critically, labels such as mannerism are a helpful term of reference, and enable opportunities for new scholars to become aware of the issues involved in art classification. In fact it could be the existence of art history courses that reinforce or necessitate such labels (Kaufman, 2010), in order to enable such debates to have a common terms of reference however problematic. 6 Conclusion There are always going to exceptions when classifying art historical epochs. We have seen how Michelangelo might be deemed as the greatest practitioner of High Renaissance, but also reverted to an anti-classic methods leaving speculation that is difficult for some art historians to reconcile. Perugino was also hard to classify in historical reference. The problems with classification have probably got a lot to do with the nature of language, especially written language. Until Vasari oral tradition had prevailed where information is temporal not material. The following tradition of written history meant the emergence of the Historian/analyst and the specific discipline associated with this practice. Most art historians like the debate to be simple, rounded and clearly articulated without confusion. Mannerism does not work as a perfect narrative and is hard to present conclusively as a period without contradiction. But it would be hard not to stumble across contradictions considering t he length of time spanned by this era; nearly one hundred years. Meidema (1978) certainly believes that it is inadequate to tie up this amount of time with one simplistic label. The problem probably accrued as there was only a few chroniclers recording the achievements of that time, and so large generalisations occurred. But given that there was a discernable shift in the collective intellectual imagination during that time it needs to occupy its own identifiable place in reference to written history. The term Mannerist is useful for a general referral to an art practice from 1510-1600, but also deplete and extremely awkward if you wish to investigate certain aspect of that era in more detail. One might say that the term Mannerism is no less stigmatizing than the term Fauvism used to describe modern European colourists comprising of that group. But whilst even here there may be some confusion and artists that do not fit the description comfortably as the time scale for the Fauves wa s reduced to four years.

Anne Spencer :: essays research papers

The Atypical Woman in a Typical World Do many people know who Anne Spencer is? Probably not. Anne Spencer was a Harlem Renaissance poet who actually lived in Lynchburg, Virginia. She immensely enjoyed working in her garden and spending time in Edankraal, a small cottage in her garden where she wrote most of her poetry. Though Anne was a hard worker, she definitely was not a typical woman of the early 20th century. Anne and her husband, Edward, did many things that were not typical during the early 20th century, but these "atypical" characteristics made the couple very unique. Anne was the "unannounced" valedictorian of her class at the Virginia Theological Seminary and College (Potter 129). This was unusual because at the time African American women were able to attend school, but most did not go to college, much less become the valedictorian of the graduating class. Though some say that Anne was not the valedictorian of her class, but rather a shy girl was the valedictorian, and Anne definitely was not shy ("Anne Bethel"). Anne’s intelligence definitely shows throughout her work. Spencer did not work simply to earn money; she worked because she enjoyed what she was doing. According to A History of Women in the West, the women of the early 20th century were still working at home, keeping the children, doing house chores, and some even worked on the farm. When World War I broke out because of the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, most women went to work in factories (24). Anne did not work in a factory; but she did work at Jones Memorial Library’s Dunbar Branch for $75 a month. Anne was not the typical librarian hired for this job. Though the library only served African American patrons, the position as a librarian normally went to a white person. She convinced the employer that she was qualified by showing him/her that she was a published poet. She also taught at her alma mater, the Virginia Theological Seminary and College for free, just because she loved teaching (Clark). On the other hand, Edward was Lynchburg, Virginia’s fir st parcel postman. Not only was this an enormous achievement for the city of Lynchburg, but also because Edward was an African American. Edward also helped out with the family grocery store which was close to their home on 1313 Pierce Street. The pay he received helped the family’s financial situation tremendously (Salmon 18).

The Versailles Treaty

Climbing from the Versailles Treaty The Versailles Treaty was commissioned by Great Britain, France, and a defeated Germany. Together they hoped the treaty would stabilize Europe and guarantee another world war would never happen again. However, just over two decades later, once again war engulfed Europe. So, is it logical that the question be asked; how did the Versailles Treaty help cause World War II? The treaty put much punishment on Germany by territory losses, major military restrictions, economical reparations, and the War Guilt Clause.World War II was one of the greatest wars of all time. One of the components that led up to this was German territorial losses. These losses included the Polish Corridor, Danzig, Alsace Lorraine, and a piece of Denmark. Out of these the Polish Corridor and Danzig impaired Germany the most because by taking the Polish Corridor it split the country into two parts, cutting some people away from their families. Also, the loss of Danzig, a major port city, as well as the loss of big coal-producing territories, greatly diminished the German economy.This reduced the German coal-production by forty percent. The people that in habituated these lost areas would have a hard life becoming accustomed to the new rule and being told that they were no longer considered a part of Germany. The peoples had resentment for the new power along with a lack of loyalty, and being discriminated against. Hitler suggests that Germans should respond to the Versailles Treaty with blood shad and valance. He says â€Å". . . No nation can remove this hand from its throat except by the sword. (DOC A) (DOC B) According to article 160 of the Versailles Treaty, the German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry by no later than March 31, 1920. After the passing of this date the total number of German military troops must not exceed one hundred thousand men, this total includes officers. Also, the total eff ective strength of officers, which includes the personnel of staffs, must not go over four thousand.This article continues with the role in which the army should play. The army should be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order and peace within the territory and to the control of the German frontiers. When the regulations were put into force, Germany’s Army weakened. France became the superior military force. Thus, making the Germans feel insecure about themselves and their protection. These insecurities felt by the Germans from the military restrictions, added to World War II, by making them feel less in control.The damage done during World War I was very severe and the victorious countries wanted this damage to be paid for by Germany in the aftermath. The Versailles Treaty required Germany to agree that she will make compensation for all the damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated powers. This also included their property, during the perio d of the belligerency (DOC C #1). The reparations that are to be made by Germany were determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, who is to consider the claims and give Germany the opportunity to defend its self.Article 233 states, â€Å"The Commission shall draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligations within a period of thirty years from May 1, 1921. † The amount of reparations set was 132 billion gold marks or $367 billion at the value in 2010. This angered and humiliated the Germans who paid very little of the reparations in the 1920s. The amounts were reduced in 1929 (from 1921) to 112 billion gold marks or $341 billion. Within the next three years the Germans paid only two billion gold marks (this does not include American Loans) (DOC C # 2).The treaty also states that if Germany fails to meet its obligations any remaining unpaid balance may be postponed for future payment or can be handled in another ma nner, that will be determined by the Allied and Associated Government affirm. Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, also referred to as the War Guilt Clause, forced Germany to accept the responsibility that they alone caused World War I and that it was their duty to pay reparations to the Allied and Associated Governments affirm(DOC D # 1).This clause was the justification for reparations. The Germans, on the other hand, saw this treaty, â€Å"as an atrocious injustice, an evil thing which must be destroyed. † (DOC D # 2) The knowledge of the treaty was embedded into the minds of the Germans, and only one word can describe how they felt: humiliation. This is why German enthusiasm, arising from the Nazi regiment, came from the way Hitler resurrected Germany from the ashes of World War I. He restored their sense of pride, and their sense of self respect, making the world look at German anew.Although, the Versailles Treaty was a major component in the start of the Second World W ar, there were many other components that added to the ignition of the war. The Versailles Treaty alone was the most influential because it caused anger and humiliation throughout the German regiment. The treaty itself was supposed to guarantee the prevention of a Second World War, but ended up causing an even bigger uprising than thought, by territorial losses, major military restriction, economical reparations, and the War Guilt Clause.Sources: DOC A: Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 1924 DOC B: Treaty of Versailles, 1919, Article 160 and German political cartoon, 1920 DOC C # 1: Treaty of Versailles, 1919, Articles 232 and 233 DOC C # 2: Chart complied from varied sources including John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1920; Charles Mee, the End of Order: Versailles, 1919 DOC D # 1: Treaty of Versailles, 1919, Article 231 DOC D # 2: Laurence V. Moyer, Victory Must Be Ours: Germany in the Great War 1914-1918, 1995

Can You Say What Your Strategy Is

www. hbr. org It’s a dirty little secret: Most executives cannot articulate the objective, scope, and advantage of their business in a simple statement. If they can’t, neither can anyone else. Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? by David J. Collis and Michael G. Rukstad Reprint R0804E It’s a dirty little secret: Most executives cannot articulate the objective, scope, and advantage of their business in a simple statement. If they can’t, neither can anyone else. Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? by David J. Collis and Michael G. Rukstad COPYRIGHT  © 2008 HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL PUBLISHING CORPORATION. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Can you summarize your company’s strategy in 35 words or less? If so, would your colleagues put it the same way? It is our experience that very few executives can honestly answer these simple questions in the af? rmative. And the companies that those executives work for are often the most successful in their industry. One is Edward Jones, a St. Louis–based brokerage ? rm with which one of us has been involved for more than 10 years. The fourth-largest brokerage in the United States, Jones has quadrupled its market share during the past two decades, has consistently outperformed its rivals in terms of ROI through bull and bear markets, and has been a ? xture on Fortune’s list of the top companies to work for. It’s a safe bet that just about every one of its 37,000 employees could express the company’s succinct strategy statement: Jones aims to â€Å"grow to 17,000 ? nancial advisers by 2012 [from about 10,000 today] by offering trusted and convenient face-to-face ? ancial advice to conservative individual investors who delegate their ? nanharvard business review †¢ april 2008 cial decisions, through a national network of one-? nancial-adviser of? ces. † Conversely, companies that don’t have a simple and clear statement of strategy are likely to fall into the sorry category of those that have failed to execute their strategy or, worse, those that never even had one. In an as tonishing number of organizations, executives, frontline employees, and all those in between are frustrated because no clear strategy exists for the company or its lines of business. The kinds of complaints that abound in such ? rms include: †¢ â€Å"I try for months to get an initiative off the ground, and then it is shut down because ‘it doesn’t ? t the strategy. ’ Why didn’t anyone tell me that at the beginning? † †¢ â€Å"I don’t know whether I should be pursuing this market opportunity. I get mixed signals from the powers that be. † †¢ â€Å"Why are we bidding on this customer’s business again? We lost it last year, and I thought we agreed then not to waste our time chasing the contract! † page 1 Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? David J. Collis ([email  protected] du) is an adjunct professor in the strategy unit of Harvard Business School in Boston and the author of several books on corporate strategy. He has studied and consulted to Edward Jones, the brokerage that is the main example in this article, and has taught in the firm’s management-development program. Michael G . Rukstad was a senior research fellow at Harvard Business School, where he taught for many years until his untimely death in 2006. †¢ â€Å"Should I cut the price for this customer? I don’t know if we would be better off winning the deal at a lower price or just losing the business. Leaders of ? rms are mysti? ed when what they thought was a beautifully crafted strategy is never implemented. They assume that the initiatives described in the voluminous documentation that emerges from an annual budget or a strategic-planning process will ensure competitive success. They fail to appreciate the necessity of having a simple, clear, succinct strategy statement that everyone can internalize and use as a guiding light for making dif? cult choices. Think of a major business as a mound of 10,000 iron ? lings, each one representing an employee. If you scoop up that many ? ings and drop them onto a piece of paper, they’ll be pointing in every direction. It will be a big mes s: 10,000 smart people working hard and making what they think are the right decisions for the company—but with the net result of confusion. Engineers in the R&D department are creating a product with â€Å"must have† features for which (as the marketing group could have told them) customers will not pay; the sales force is selling customers on quick turnaround times and customized offerings even though the manufacturing group has just invested in equipment designed for long production runs; and so on. If you pass a magnet over those ? ings, what happens? They line up. Similarly, a well-understood statement of strategy aligns behavior within the business. It allows everyone in the organization to make individual choices that reinforce one another, rendering those 10,000 employees exponentially more effective. What goes into a good statement of strategy? Michael Porter’s seminal article â€Å"What Is Strategy? † (HBR November–December 1996) lays out the characteristics of strategy in a conceptual fashion, conveying the essence of strategic choices and distinguishing them from the relentless but competitively fruitless search for operational ef? iency. However, we have found in our work both with executives and with students that Porter’s article does not answer the more basic question of how to describe a particular ? rm’s strategy. It is a dirty little secret that most executives don’t actually know what all the elements of a strategy statement are, which makes it impossible for them to develop one. With a clear de? nition, though, two things happen: First, formulation becomes in? nitely easier because executives know what they are trying to create. Second, implementation becomes much simpler because the strategy’s essence can be readily communicated and easily internalized by everyone in the organization. Elements of a Strategy Statement The late Mike Rukstad, who contributed enormously to this article, identi? ed three critical components of a good strategy statement— objective, scope, and advantage—and rightly believed that executives should be forced to be crystal clear about them. These elements are a simple yet suf? cient list for any strategy (whether business or military) that addresses competitive interaction over unbounded terrain. Any strategy statement must begin with a de? nition of the ends that the strategy is designed to achieve. â€Å"If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there† is the appropriate maxim here. If a nation has an unclear sense of what it seeks to achieve from a military campaign, how can it have a hope of attaining its goal? The de? nition of the objective should include not only an end point but also a time frame for reaching it. A strategy to get U. S. troops out of Iraq at some distant point in the future would be very different from a strategy to bring them home within two years. Since most ? rms compete in a more or less unbounded landscape, it is also crucial to de? ne the scope, or domain, of the business: the part of the landscape in which the ? rm will operate. What are the boundaries beyond which it will not venture? If you are planning to enter the restaurant business, will you provide sit-down or quick service? A casual or an upscale atmosphere? What type of food will you offer—French or Mexican? What geographic area will you serve—the Midwest or the East Coast? Alone, these two aspects of strategy are insuf? ient. You could go into business tomorrow with the goal of becoming the world’s largest hamburger chain within 10 years. But will anyone invest in your company if you have not explained how you are going to reach your objective? Your competitive advantage is the essence of your strategy: What harvard business review †¢ april 2008 page 2 Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? your business will do differently from or better t han others de? nes the all-important means by which you will achieve your stated objective. That advantage has complementary external and internal components: a value proposition that explains why the targeted customer should buy your product above all the alternatives, and a description of how internal activities must be aligned so that only your ? rm can deliver that value proposition. De? ning the objective, scope, and advantage requires trade-offs, which Porter identi? ed as fundamental to strategy. If a ? rm chooses to pursue growth or size, it must accept that pro? tability will take a back seat. If it chooses to serve institutional clients, it may ignore retail customers. If the value proposition is lower prices, the company will not be able to compete on, for example, fashion or ? t. Finally, if the advantage comes from scale economies, the ? rm will not be able to accommodate idiosyncratic customer needs. Such trade-offs are what distinguish individual companies strategically. De? ning the Objective The ? rst element of a strategy statement is the one that most companies have in some A Hierarchy of Company Statements Organizational direction comes in several forms. The mission statement is your loftiest guiding light—and your least speci? c. As you work your way down the hierarchy, the statements become more concrete, practical, and ultimately unique. No other company will have the same strategy statement, which de? nes your competitive advantage, or balanced scorecard, which tracks how you implement your particular strategy. MISSION Why we exist VALUES What we believe in and how we will behave VISION What we want to be STRATEGY What our competitive game plan will be BALANCED SCORECARD How we will monitor and implement that plan The BASIC ELEMENTS of a Strategy Statement OBJECTIVE = Ends SCOPE = Domain ADVANTAGE = Means form or other. Unfortunately, the form is usually wrong. Companies tend to confuse their statement of values or their mission with their strategic objective. A strategic objective is not, for example, the platitude of â€Å"maximizing shareholder wealth by exceeding customer expectations for _______ [insert product or service here] and providing opportunities for our employees to lead ful? lling lives while respecting the environment and the communities in which we operate. † Rather, it is the single precise objective that will drive the business over the next ? ve years or so. (See the exhibit â€Å"A Hierarchy of Company Statements. ) Many companies do have—and all ? rms should have—statements of their ultimate purpose and the ethical values under which they will operate, but neither of these is the strategic objective. The mission statement spells out the underlying motivation for being in business in the ? rst place—the contribution to society that the ? rm aspires to make. (An insurance company, for example, might de? ne its mission as providing ? nancial security to consumers. ) Such statements, however, are not useful as strategic goals to drive today’s business decisions. Similarly, it is good and proper that ? ms be clear with employees about ethical values. But principles such as respecting individual differences and sustaining the environment are not strategic. They govern how employees should behave (â€Å"doing things right†); they do not guide what the ? rm should do (â€Å"the right thing to do†). Firms in the same business often have the same mission. (Don’t all insurance companies aspire to provide ? nancial security to their customers? ) They may also have the same values. They might even share a vision: an indeterminate future goal such as being the â€Å"recognized leader in the insurance ? eld. However, it is unlikely that even two companies in the same business will have the same strategic objecti ve. Indeed, if your ? rm’s strategy can be applied to any other ? rm, you don’t have a very good one. It is always easy to claim that maximizing shareholder value is the company’s objective. In some sense all strategies are designed to do this. However, the question to ask when creating an actionable strategic statement is, Which objective is most likely to maximize shareholder value over the next several years? harvard business review †¢ april 2008 page 3 Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? Growth? Achieving a certain market share? Becoming the market leader? ) The strategic objective should be speci? c, measurable, and time bound. It should also be a single goal. It is not suf? cient to say, â€Å"We seek to grow pro? tably. † Which matters more—growth or pro? tability? A salesperson needs to know the answer when she’s deciding how aggressive to be on price. There could well be a host of subordinate goals that follow from the strategic objective, and these might serve as metrics on a balanced scorecard that monitors progress for which individuals will be held accountable. Yet the ultimate objective that will drive the operation of the business over the next several years should always be clear. The choice of objective has a profound impact on a ? rm. When Boeing shifted its primary goal from being the largest player in the aircraft industry to being the most profitable, it had to restructure the entire organization, from sales to manufacturing. For example, the company dropped its policy of competing with Airbus to the last cent on every deal and abandoned its commitment to maintain a manufacturing capacity that could deliver more than half a peak year’s demand for planes. Another company, after years of seeking to maximize pro? ts at the expense of growth, issued a corporate mandate to generate at least 10% organic growth per year. The change in strategy forced the ? rm to switch its focus from shrinking to serve only its pro? table core customers and competing on the basis of cost or ef? ciency to differentiating its products, which led to a host of new product features and services that appealed to a wider set of customers. At Edward Jones, discussion among the partners about the ? rm’s objective ignited a passionate exchange. One said, â€Å"Our ultimate objective has to be maximizing pro? t per partner. † Another responded, â€Å"Not all ? nancial advisers are partners—so if we maximize revenue per partner, we are ignoring the other 30,000-plus people who make the business work! † Another added, â€Å"Our ultimate customer is the client. We cannot just worry about partner pro? ts. In fact, we should start by maximizing value for the customer and let the pro? ts ? ow to us from there! † And so on. This intense debate not only drove alignment with the objective of healthy growth in the number of ? ancial advisers but also ensured that every implication of that choice was fully explored. Setting an ambitious growth target at each point in its 85-year history, Edward Jones has continually increased its scale and market presence. Striving to achieve such growth has increased long-term pro? t per adviser and led the ? rm to its unique con? guration: Its only pro? t center is the ind ividual ? nancial adviser. Other activities, even investment banking, serve as support functions and are not held accountable for generating pro? t. De? ning the Scope A ? m’s scope encompasses three dimensions: customer or offering, geographic location, and vertical integration. Clearly de? ned boundaries in those areas should make it obvious to managers which activities they should concentrate on and, more important, which they should not do. The three dimensions may vary in relevance. For Edward Jones, the most important is the customer. The ? rm is con? gured to meet the needs of one very speci? c type of client. Unlike just about every other brokerage in the business, Jones does not de? ne its archetypal customer by net worth or income. Nor does it use demographics, profession, or spending habits. Rather, the de? nition is psychographic: The company’s customers are long-term investors who have a conservative investment philosophy and are uncomfortable making serious ? nancial decisions without the support of a trusted adviser. In the terminology of the business, Jones targets the â€Å"delegator,† not the â€Å"validator† or the â€Å"do-it-yourselfer. † The scope of an enterprise does not prescribe exactly what should be done within the speci? ed bounds. In fact, it encourages experimentation and initiative. But to ensure that the borders are clear to all employees, the scope should specify where the ? rm or business will not go. That will prevent managers from spending long hours on projects that get turned down by higher-ups because they do not ? t the strategy. For example, clarity about who the customer is and who it is not has kept Edward Jones from pursuing day traders. Even at the height of the internet bubble, the company chose not to introduce online trading (it is harvard business review †¢ april 2008 page 4 Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? till not available to Jones customers). Unlike the many brokerages that committed hundreds of millions of dollars and endless executive hours to debates over whether to introduce online trading (and if so, how to price and position it in a way that did not cannibalize or con? ict with traditional offerings), Jones wasted no money or time on that decision because it had set clear boundaries. Similarly, Jones is not vertically integrate d into proprietary mutual funds, so as not to violate the independence of its ? nancial advisers and undermine clients’ trust. Nor will he company offer penny stocks, shares from IPOs, commodities, or options—investment products that it believes are too risky for the conservative clients it chooses to serve. And it does not have metropolitan of? ces in business districts, because they would not allow for the convenient, face-to-face interactions in casual settings that the ? rm seeks to provide. Knowing not to extend its scope in these directions has allowed the ? rm to focus on doing what it does well and reap the bene? ts of simplicity, standardization, and deep experience. De? ning the Advantage Wal-Mart’s Value Proposition Wal-Mart’s value proposition can be summed up as â€Å"everyday low prices for a broad range of goods that are always in stock in convenient geographic locations. † It is those aspects of the customer experience that the company overdelivers relative to competitors. Underperformance on other dimensions, such as ambience and sales help, is a strategic choice that generates cost savings, which fuel the company’s price advantage. If the local mom-and-pop hardware store has survived, it also has a value proposition: convenience, proprietors who have known you for years, free coffee and doughnuts on Saturday mornings, and so on. Sears falls in the middle on many criteria. As a result, customers lack a lot of compelling reasons to shop there, which goes a long way toward explaining why the company is struggling to remain pro? table. Customer purchase criteria* Low prices Selection across categories Rural convenience Reliable prices In-stock merchandise Merchandise quality Suburban convenience Selection within categories Sales help Ambience poor Delivery on criteria * in approximate order of importance to Wal-Mart’s target customer group Source: Jan Rivkin, Harvard Business School Mom & pop stores Sears Wal-Mart excellent Given that a sustainable competitive advantage is the essence of strategy, it should be no surprise that advantage is the most critical aspect of a strategy statement. Clarity about what makes the ? rm distinctive is what most helps employees understand how they can contribute to successful execution of its strategy. As mentioned above, the complete de? nition of a ? rm’s competitive advantage consists of two parts. The ? rst is a statement of the customer value proposition. Any strategy statement that cannot explain why customers should buy your product or service is doomed to failure. A simple graphic that maps your value proposition against those of rivals can be an extremely easy and useful way of identifying what makes yours distinctive. (See the exhibit â€Å"Wal-Mart’s Value Proposition. †) The second part of the statement of advantage captures the unique activities or the complex combination of activities allowing that ? rm alone to deliver the customer value proposition. This is where the strategy statement draws from Porter’s de? nition of strategy as making consistent choices about the con? guration of the ? rm’s activities. It is also where the activity-system map that Porter describes in â€Å"What Is Strategy? comes into play. As the exhibit â€Å"Edward Jones’s ActivitySystem Map† shows, the brokerage’s value proposition is to provide convenient, trusted, personal service and advice. What is most distinctive about Jones is that it has only one ? nancial adviser in an of? ce, which allows it to have mor e of? ces (10,000 nationally) than competitors do. Merrill Lynch has about 15,000 brokers but only 1,000 of? ces. To make it easy for its targeted customers to visit at their convenience—and to provide a relaxed, harvard business review †¢ april 2008 page 5 Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? ersonable, nonthreatening environment— Jones puts its of? ces in strip malls and the retail districts of rural areas and suburbs rather than high-rise buildings in the central business districts of big cities. These choices alone require Jones to differ radically from other brokerages in the con? guration of its activities. With no branch-of? ce management providing direction or support, each ? nancial adviser must be an entrepreneur who delights in running his or her own operation. Since such people are an exception in the industry, Jones has to bring all its own ? ancial advisers in from other industries or backgrounds and train them, at great expense. Until 2007, when it sw itched to an internet-based service, the ? rm had to have its own satellite network to provide its widely dispersed of? ces with real-time quotes and allow them to execute trades. Because the company has 10,000 separate of? ces, its real estate and communication costs are about 50% higher than the industry average. However, all those of? ces allow the ? nancial advisers who run them to deliver convenient, trusted, personal service and advice. Other successful players in this industry also have distinctive value propositions Edward Jones’s Activity-System Map This map illustrates how activities at the brokerage Edward Jones connect to deliver competitive advantage. The ? rm’s customer value proposition appears near the center of the map—in the â€Å"customer relationship† bubble—and the supporting activities hang off it. Only the major connections are shown. TARGET CUSTOMER individual conservative delegates decisions PRODUCT blue chips PRICE one-time commission mutual funds HEADQUARTERS St. Louis home of? e for all activities TECHNOLOGY satellite (historically) LOCATION rural suburban strip mall REGIONAL STRUCTURE no regional management COMPENSATION each ? nancial adviser is a pro? t center ONE FINANCIAL ADVISER PER OFFICE advisers run their own of? ces MARKETING local mailings knocking on doors INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY long-term buy and hold CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP face-to-face convenient tru sted ? nancial adviser VALUES & CULTURE volunteerism mentoring BRANCH SUPPORT branch-of? ce assistant OWNERSHIP partnership, not public BROKER TYPE entrepreneur member of community HIRE & TRAIN hire from outside industry internally train all ? ancial advisers harvard business review †¢ april 2008 page 6 Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? and unique con? gurations of activities to support them. Merrill Lynch. During the ? ve-year tenure of former CEO Stan O’Neal, who retired in October 2007, Merrill Lynch developed an effective strategy that it called â€Å"Total Merrill. † The company’s value proposition: to provide for all the ? nancial needs of its high-net-worth customers—those with liquid ? nancial assets of more than $250,000—through retirement. While a lot of brokerages cater to people with a high net worth, they focus on asset accumulation before retirement. Merrill’s view is that as baby boomers age and move from the relatively simple phase of accumulating assets to the much more complex, higher-risk phase of drawing cash from their retirement accounts, their needs change. During this stage, they will want to consolidate their ? nancial assets with a single trusted partner that can help them ? gure out how to optimize income over their remaining years by making the best decisions on everything from annuities to payout ratios to long-term-care insurance. Merrill offers coherent ? nancial plans for The Strategic Sweet Spot The strategic sweet spot of a company is where it meets customers’ needs in a way that rivals can’t, given the context in which it competes. CONTEXT (technology, industry demographics, regulation, and so on) COMPETITORS’ offerings CUSTOMERS’ needs SWEET SPOT COMPANY’S capabilities such customers and provides access to a very wide range of sophisticated products based on a Monte Carlo simulation of the probabilities of running out of money according to different annual rates of return on different categories of assets. How does Merrill intend to deliver this value to its chosen customers in a way that’s unique among large ? ms? First, it is pushing brokers—especially new ones—to become certi? ed ? nancial planners and has raised internal training requirements to put them on that road. The certi? ed ? nancial planner license is more dif? cult for brokers to obtain than the standard Series 7 license, because it requires candidates to have a college degree and to master nearly 100 integrated ? nancialplanning topics. Second, Merrill offers all forms of insurance, annuities, covered calls, hedge funds, banking services, and so on (unlike Edward Jones, which offers a much more limited menu of investment products). Since several of these products are technically complex, Merrill needs product specialists to support the client-facing broker. This â€Å"Team Merrill† organization poses very different HR and compensation issues from those posed by Edward Jones’s single-adviser of? ces. Merrill’s compensation system has to share income among the team members and reward referrals. Wells Fargo. This San Francisco bank competes in the brokerage business as part of its tactic to cross-sell services to its retail banking customers in order to boost pro? t per customer. It aims to sell each customer at least eight different products. ) Wells Fargo’s objective for its brokerage arm, clearly stated in a recent annual report, is to triple its share of customers’ ? nancial assets. The brokerage’s means for achieving this goal is the parent company’s database of 23 million customers, many of them brought into the ? rm through one particular aspect of the bankin g relationship: the mortgage. Wells Fargo differs from Edward Jones and Merrill Lynch in its aim to offer personalized, rather than personal, service. For example, the ? m’s IT system allows a bank clerk to know a limited amount of information about a customer (name, birthday, and so on) and appear to be familiar with him or her, which is quite different from the ongoing individual relationships that Jones and Merrill brokers have with their clients. harvard business review †¢ april 2008 page 7 Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? LPL Financial. Different again is LPL Financial, with of? ces in Boston, San Diego, and Charlotte, North Carolina. LPL sees its brokers (all of whom are independent ? nancial advisers af? liated with the ? rm) rather than consumers as its clients and has con? ured all of its activities to provide individualized solutions and the highest payouts to its brokers. This means that the vast majority of the activities performed by the corporate headquar ters staff are services, such as training, that brokers choose and pay for on an a la carte basis. As a result, LPL’s headquarters staff is very small (0. 20 people per broker) compared with that of Edward Jones (1. 45 people per broker). Low overhead allows LPL to offer a higher payout to brokers than Jones and Merrill do, which is its distinctive value proposition to its chosen customer: the broker. By now it should be apparent how a careful description of the unique activities a ? rm performs to generate a distinctive customer value proposition effectively captures its strategy. A relatively simple description in a strategy statement provides an incisive characterization that could not belong to any other ? rm. This is the goal. When that statement has been internalized by all employees, they can easily understand how their daily activities contribute to the overall success of the ? rm and how to correctly make the dif? cult choices they confront in their jobs. Developing a Strategy Statement How, then, should a ? rm go about crafting its strategy statement? Obviously, the ? rst step is to create a great strategy, which requires careful evaluation of the industry landscape. Leaving No Room for Misinterpretation Executives at Edward Jones have developed a detailed understanding of every element of the ? rm’s strategy. Here is an example. †conservativeâ€Å" Our investment philosophy is long-term buy and hold. We do not sell penny stocks, commodities, or other high-risk instruments. As a result we do not serve day traders and see no need to offer online trading. We charge commissions on trades because this is the cheapest way to buy stocks (compared with a wrap fee, which charges annually as a percentage of assets) when the average length of time the investor holds the stock or mutual fund is over 10 years. †individualâ€Å" We do not advise institutions or companies. We do not segment according to wealth, age, or other demographics. The company will serve all customers that ? t its conservative investment philosophy. Brokers will call on any and every potential customer. Stories abound within Jones of millionaires who live in trailers—people all the other brokerages would never think of approaching. investorsâ€Å" Our basic service is investment. We do not seek to offer services such as checking accounts for their own sake, but only as part of the management of a client’s assets. †who delegate their ? nancial decisionsâ€Å" We do not target self-directed do-it-yourselfers, who are comfortable making their own investment decisions. We are also unlikely to serve validators, who are merely looking for reassurance that their decisions are correct. Edward Jones’s Strategy Statement To grow to 17,000 ? nancial advisers by 2012 by offering trusted and convenient face-to-face ? ancial advice to conservative individual investors who delegate their ? nancial decisions, through a national network of one-? nancialadviser of? ces. harvard business review †¢ april 2008 page 8 Can You Say What Your Strategy Is? This includes developing a detailed understanding of customer needs, segmenting customers, and then identifying unique ways of creating value for the ones the ? rm chooses to serve. It also calls for an analysis of competitors’ current strategies and a prediction of how they might change in the future. The process must involve a rigorous, objective assessment of the ? m’s capabilities and resources and those of competitors, as described in â€Å"Competing on Resources: Strategy in the 1990s,† by David J. Collis and Cynthia A. Montgomery (HBR July–August 1995)—not just a feel-good exercise of identifying core competencies. The creative part of developing strategy is ? nding the sweet spot that aligns the ? rm’s capabilities with customer needs in a way that competitors cannot match given the changing external context—factors such as technology, industry demographics, and regulation. (See the exhibit â€Å"The Strategic Sweet Spot. ) We have found that one of the best ways to do this is to develop two or three plausible but very different strategic options. For example, ? eshing out two dramatically different alternatives—becoming a cheap Red Lobster or a ? sh McDonald’s—helped executives at the Long John Silver’s chain of restaurants understand the strategic choices that they had to make. They had been trying to do a bit of everything, and this exercise showed them that their initiativ es—such as offering early-evening table service and expanding drive-through service—were strategically inconsistent. Competing on the basis of table service requires bigger restaurants and more employees, while drive-through service requires high-traf? c locations and smaller footprints. ) As a result, they chose to be a ? sh McDonald’s, building smaller restaurants with drive-through service in hightraf? c locations. The process of developing the strategy and then crafting the statement that captures its essence in a readily communicable manner should involve employees in all parts of the company and at all levels of the hierarchy. The wording of the strategy statement should be worked through in painstaking detail. In fact, that can be the most powerful part of the strategy development process. It is usually in heated discussions over the choice of a single word that a strategy is crystallized and executives truly understand what it will involve. The end result should be a brief statement that re? ects the three elements of an effective strategy. It should be accompanied by detailed annotations that elucidate the strategy’s nuances (to preempt any possible misreading) and spell out its implications. See the exhibit â€Å"Leaving No Room for Misinterpretation. †) When the strategy statement is circulated throughout the company, the value proposition chart and activity-system map should be attached. They serve as simple reminders of the twin aspects of competitive advantage that underpin the strategy. Cascading the statement throughout the organization, so that each level of management will be the teacher for the level below, becomes the starting point for incorporating strategy into everyone’s behavior. The strategy will really have traction only when executives can be con? ent that the actions of empowered frontline employees will be guided by the same principles that they themselves follow. †¢Ã¢â‚¬ ¢Ã¢â‚¬ ¢ The value of rhetoric should not be underestimated. A 35-word statement can have a substantial impact on a company’s success. Words do lead to action. Spending the time to develop the few words that truly capture your strategy and that will energize and empower your people will raise the long-term ? nancial performance of your organization. Reprint R0804E To order, see the next page or call 800-988-0886 or 617-783-7500 or go to www. br. org harvard business review †¢ april 2008 page 9 Further Reading The Harvard Business Review Paperback Series Here are the landmark ideas—both contemporary and classic—that have established Harvard B usiness Review as required reading for businesspeople around the globe. Each paperback includes eight of the leading articles on a particular business topic. The series includes over thirty titles, including the following best-sellers: Harvard Business Review on Brand Management Product no. 1445 Harvard Business Review on Change Product no. 842 Harvard Business Review on Leadership Product no. 8834 Harvard Business Review on Managing People Product no. 9075 Harvard Business Review on Measuring Corporate Performance Product no. 8826 For a complete list of the Harvard Business Review paperback series, go to www. hbr. org. To Order For Harvard Business Review reprints and subscriptions, call 800-988-0886 or 617-783-7500. Go to www. hbr. org For customized and quantity orders of Harvard Business Review article reprints, call 617-783-7626, or e-mail [email  protected] harvard. edu page 10